tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post1746415799629647787..comments2024-01-21T14:29:38.613-08:00Comments on Dangerous Idea 2: Four Features of the MentalVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger73125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-79699166408819312802008-04-13T08:44:00.000-07:002008-04-13T08:44:00.000-07:00Hi Darek,I'll try to sum up my POV on this thread....Hi Darek,<BR/><BR/>I'll try to sum up my POV on this thread...<BR/><BR/>There are technical or factual assumptions about rationality, and then there are moral assumptions.<BR/><BR/>Suppose I give you a math problem. x=5, x+y=11, y=?<BR/><BR/>Obviously, x=5 is an axiom in this context. Ought you assume x=5? What if you don't feel like assuming x=5? <BR/><BR/>I think you will agree that how you feel about setting x=5 is irrelevant to the question. The "ought" of the assumption does not change the contingent facts of the assumption. That's what makes y=6 the objective answer to the math problem. When we say y=6 is objectively the answer, we mean that, <I>if you assume the axioms (both facts and procedures)</I>, the result follows.<BR/><BR/>Similarly, if we assume the facts and procedures we regard as inherent to rationality, we can rationally and objectively show what rational behavior consists of, and what the advantages of such behavior will be. We can also prove that a particular mechanism behaves rationally.<BR/><BR/>Now your criticism of reductionism is that the existence of a rational machine (one which is compelled to think rationally) cannot prove that we "ought" to think rationally. Your claim is true, but irrelevant. The reductionist model doesn't have to prove that. <BR/><BR/>Is it true that my heart ought to beat? No, and no amount of analysis of what my heart is will show that it "ought" to beat. But analysis can show that my heart is compelled to beat. Your metanorm argument is equivalent to saying that hearts cannot be reduced to matter because that would only show that a heart was compelled to beat, not that it ought to.<BR/><BR/>The metanorm (as I understand your definition) does not say that we cannot create a rational AI. You are saying that any such machine will not prove that a computer ought to be rational. <BR/><BR/>I suspect some dualists' might say that we programmers put the "ought" of the metanorm into the AI. However, the ought in the machine takes the form of a compulsion, and evolution is quite capable of putting compulsions into life forms. There's no conservation law of "oughts".<BR/><BR/>Finally, I do think that the metanorm is an example of morality in general. The morality of the metanorm is distinct from the morality of the Golden Rule, but that doesn't mean the metanorm's morality is not part of morality in general. The use of the word "correctness" doesn't escape this, in my view. Correctness has objective meaning in the context of the axioms of rationality. The metanorm is about is whether we "ought" to accept the axioms, not whether we can label theorems as correct or incorrect once we have assumed the axioms.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-39949591084086127702008-04-10T19:31:00.000-07:002008-04-10T19:31:00.000-07:00DLAdmittedly, instincts such as fear and hunger ha...DL<BR/><BR/>Admittedly, instincts such as fear and hunger have a "felt" component that cannot be captured in a proposition. Calling the rational sense an "instinct" is questionable for the same reason. Your last post to me, however, implies that the instinctive fear of falling has a moral aspect. It doesn't. If I start to fall from a height, the instinctive twinge that I feel is panic, not guilt. Fear of falling is not a conviction that falling is unethical.<BR/><BR/>For that matter, all through that post you seem to bring in the normativity of morality as if it were the same as that of rationality. They are distinct. A person can reason impeccably about the best way to cheat investors or carry out a terrorist plot. On the other hand, a person with limited capacity for reasoning can show moral sensitivity. If we find we have made a mistake in reasoning, we tend to feel embarrassment or frustration but not guilt. The normativity of rationality is better captured by the term "correct" than the term "ought," although "correct" can be used in a moral context and "ought" in a rational one.<BR/><BR/>I, too, am confident that we cannot confirm moral propositions from observation, but conflating moral "oughts" with rational "oughts" confuses the issue at hand.<BR/><BR/>What I introduced near the start of this discussion was a proposition (I will spare everyone yet another restatement) that I call the metanorm of rationality. It is just that, a proposition, and therefore capable of taking a clear "true" or "false" qualifier. The proposition makes an irreducible distinction, but one that cannot be subsumed under rationalism precisely because it cannot be confirmed from observation.<BR/><BR/>After all this verbiage, I am still not sure whether you even think the proposition is true, much less whether the distinction it makes is reducible. At times you seem to acknowledge that it cannot be confirmed, but then claim that it can be projected onto mechanism, leaving it in a no-man's-land between reducibility and irreducibility. It seems lately that you think the irreducible aspect is moral and therefore unprovable the way "It's wrong to steal" is unprovable.<BR/><BR/>I doubt that you grasp the self-reference and circularity that beset all attempts to find an explanation for rationality in terms of its adaptive benefits.<BR/><BR/>I am willing to leave the subject there for the moment...until we pick it up again down the line, that is. As usual, we must agree to disagree. And if I have misunderstood your position, you are welcome to correct me and close out the exchange.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-85701119118824468162008-04-10T07:11:00.000-07:002008-04-10T07:11:00.000-07:00Hi Normajean,Truth has meaning only after we assum...Hi Normajean,<BR/><BR/>Truth has meaning only after we assume axioms of rationality, and I think it would be impossible for a being to have propositional attitudes if it didn't (at least implicitly) assume the axioms of rationality. But is it the case that we objectively ought to have propositional attitudes or value truth? Well, we can show that we do or don't value truth, or that a mechanism will or will not value truth, but we can never show that it ought or ought not. We happen to feel (and cannot help ourselves feeling) that we ought to value truth, but that's subjective.<BR/><BR/>For example, I can show that a rock cannot think rationally, but I cannot show that it ought or ought not think rationally.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-71705670009462335772008-04-10T05:38:00.000-07:002008-04-10T05:38:00.000-07:00DL: What does your last post say about truth?DL: What does your last post say about truth?normajeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06612628618334389249noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-33951279043020208512008-04-09T19:03:00.000-07:002008-04-09T19:03:00.000-07:00Darek,Take other instincts and turn them into prop...Darek,<BR/><BR/><I>Take other instincts and turn them into propositions. We can turn the instinctive fear of falling into the proposition that it is a dangerous thing to fall. We can confirm that generally speaking, falling is indeed dangerous. Turn thirst in to a proposition: Our bodies need water. We can confirm biologically that, yes, our bodies do need water. And so on.</I><BR/><BR/>Whether these claims are confirmable depends on whether they include "oughts".<BR/><BR/>What is confirmable is that if we fall, we will die or be injured. That does not prove that we ought not fall. We only ought not fall if we think we ought not die or be injured. But those oughts are not confirmable either.<BR/><BR/>Same thing with drinking. We know that if we don't drink, we will dehydrate and die. But that by itself doesn't imply we ought to drink. It is only the case that we ought to drink if we want to avoid death or dehydration.<BR/><BR/>Likewise, we can show that a mechanism that reasons according to our instincts makes better inferences, predicts the world better, and avoids inconsistency. We cannot prove that a mechanism absolutely ought to do this, but we can show what a mechanism gains by doing so. <BR/><BR/>We happen to think we ought to do all of the above, but that ought is not fundamental. It is contingent. A being that fails at these things is easily imagined (and some exist), and such a being tends not to live long. That doesn't make the morality of survival or reason a fundamental force.<BR/><BR/>Thus, the proper analogy to the pulmonary system would involve the med student correctly observing that what we know about the heart and blood flow explains what the heart does and how it helps move oxygenated blood around the body. Yet, the med student will also observe that what we can confirm fails to explain in any absolute way why we <I>ought</I> to aid or impede blood flow. Just because we will die if we kill our heart muscles does not mean we ought not do it. But if we can't say why we ought to have a healthy pulmonary system, why should that cause us to think that the pulmonary system was supernatural? Does that mean pulmonary systems don't reduce?<BR/><BR/>Science tells us what is, not what ought to be. And that's the situation with the metanorm. The metanorm is not about the results of the assumption of rational axioms. The metanorm is about whether we ought to accept those axioms. That's why, if we reduce minds to mechanisms, we can show what it means to think rationally, and what the implications of thinking rationally/irrationally will be, but we cannot show that we ought to be rational.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-41926780116627225192008-04-08T23:03:00.000-07:002008-04-08T23:03:00.000-07:00DLA technical note I should make before going on:I...DL<BR/><BR/>A technical note I should make before going on:<BR/><BR/>I have chosen to state the metanorm in terms of correct ways of arriving at conclusions because it is a bit more specific than "reasoning," "logical thought," and some other optional terms, yet it is readily understood by ordinary readers.<BR/><BR/>I use "correct" instead of "consistent" because dialetheists are being taken seriously in academic discussions of logic. And there are always those who see quantum theory as challenging the strict consistency of classical logical. I am not saying that I incline toward questioning the Law of Non-Contradiction. I just feel that the AfR does not need to defeat the claims of dialetheists to go through. Even dialetheists depend upon an assumption of correctness.<BR/><BR/>Now, to your points . . . I was not claiming that GR depended upon the metanorm, but that our knowledge of it did. This goes back to your giving the metanorm of rationality trivial status compared with theories like GR. I am just observing that if the metanorm is something without which we could have no knowledge of theories like GR, it hardly deserves to be treated as of slight importance. Might even deserve to be treated as fundamental.<BR/><BR/>>>What must accord with the metanorm is our apprehension of "much of nature", not "much of nature" itself.<<<BR/><BR/>Nature itself must have the character of being understandable by rational minds in order for us to know it. But that is a side issue.<BR/><BR/>>>I'll put things another way. Assuming our instincts are correct<<<BR/><BR/>This is the issue right here. If you call our conviction about the metanorm an "instinct," it's curious that it is not an instinct we can confirm. It is an instinct that we have no choice but to trust.<BR/><BR/>Take other instincts and turn them into propositions. We can turn the instinctive fear of falling into the proposition that it is a dangerous thing to fall. We can confirm that generally speaking, falling is indeed dangerous. Turn thirst in to a proposition: Our bodies need water. We can confirm biologically that, yes, our bodies do need water. And so on.<BR/><BR/>The metanorm can be stated as a proposition, too: "There are correct as opposed to incorrect ways to arrive at conclusions." But this one we cannot confirm from observation.<BR/><BR/>The puzzle grows because we are talking about brain function. If reasoning is purely a biochemical function of the brain, then its critical parameters ought to be confirmable just as with any other biochemical process.<BR/><BR/>It would be odd, wouldn't it, if we had to say "assuming the pulmonary system maintains organ-critical oxygen levels in the blood, then we can say" and go on to describe oxygen delivery to tissues.<BR/><BR/>In that case, a bright med student might ask, "Why do we just assume that the pulmonary system does that? Can't we set up an experiment to confirm it?" And then if we had to say, "Well, it's impossible to confirm from experiment and observation that the pulmonary system can maintain critical oxygen levels, but we instinctively feel that it does." Wouldn't the med student be justified in wondering whether pulmonary oxygenation of blood fell within a naturalistic framework of medicine?Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-28247362670110140122008-04-07T22:25:00.000-07:002008-04-07T22:25:00.000-07:00Darek,The formulation of GR is only worth somethin...Darek,<BR/><BR/><I>The formulation of GR is only worth something insofar as it is a conclusion correctly arrived at, and for it to be that kind of conclusion there must be correct ways of reaching it.</I><BR/><BR/>Notice the language. "Worth something." It's worth something to a rational mind. The causal relations described by GR are not caused by the metanorm. The mechanism described by GR works whether or not a rational being is there to see it. What you are talking about is our apprehension of the mechanism of GR.<BR/><BR/><I>Apart from the metanorm nothing meaningful can even be thought about GR, much less claimed for it.</I><BR/><BR/>I don't see why this is relevant. The mechanism of GR doesn't care about rationality. Again, the metanorm has nothing to do with the mechanism of GR, it only has to do with our apprehension of and inferences about that mechanism.<BR/><BR/><I>It does to the following extent: Everything in nature apart from what is immediately present to the senses can only be apprehended in the form of conclusions correctly arrived at.</I><BR/><BR/>In other words, everything apprehended through rational means can only be apprehended according to conclusions correctly arrived at. I think this is tautological, and not a deep statement. Those minds we would recognize as rational obey the metanorm.<BR/><BR/><I>In that sense much of nature (and what lies beyond nature) must accord with the metanorm.</I><BR/><BR/>What must accord with the metanorm is our apprehension of "much of nature", not "much of nature" itself.<BR/><BR/>You discussed the cat analogy by saying that there's something about instances of cats that is distinguishable, and that this something is what we're labeling with metanorm of felinity. Fair enough.<BR/><BR/>By analogy, we would both say that there's some real perceivable difference between instances of proper reasoning and instances of improper reasoning. I totally agree that we can perceive those differences. We can perceive these differences formally. Yet the reality we are perceiving is nothing but consistency, and consistency is something that all natural systems have (because they are lawful). <BR/><BR/>In other words, let's remember that just as we talk about instances of "cat" that lead to the abstraction, there are instances of "reason" that lead to the abstraction. When we examine instances of reason over the same domain, the ones we don't like are the ones that lead to contradictions. And since contradictions are part of the model, it is easily captured by naturalism. <BR/><BR/>I'll put things another way. Assuming our instincts are correct, we can correlate good versus bad inference by the presence of contradictions. We can devise a formal model of what our instincts are telling us. Once we do this, we have a scientific way to confirm that an instance of reasoning was correct (according to our intuitions). We can't confirm the intuitions to be correct in an absolute sense, but we can confirm that the model or entity under study thinks in accordance with those intuitions.<BR/><BR/><I>But if this process or instinct were physical, it would be confirmable.</I><BR/><BR/>The thing being confirmed is that the mechanism of a naturalistic mind reaches the (substantially) correct conclusions per our instincts. That is, the formal mechanism agrees with our rational intuition. It does not have to prove the intuition itself to be correct.<BR/><BR/>What you need to make your case is a contradiction between rationality and naturalism, and I'm not seeing one at all.<BR/><BR/>Just to try to sum up the system as I see it...<BR/><BR/>1) Assume that our instinct for inference is correct.<BR/><BR/>2) Assume nature is lawful.<BR/><BR/>3) Devise a naturalistic model of rational inference and contradiction.<BR/><BR/>4) Devise a naturalistic model of human cognition.<BR/><BR/>5) Show that the model makes correct inferences (per #3), and that the model has the same instincts for correct inferences (per #1, #3).<BR/><BR/>Just because (1) cannot be rationally proven without being circular does not in any way invalidate the basic chain of inferences in the reduction. If we demonstrate (5), we demonstrate that the model makes decisions that we think are correct. It doesn't have to show that the inferences are correct (i.e., it need not prove #1).Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-61867632008856048002008-04-07T21:21:00.000-07:002008-04-07T21:21:00.000-07:00DL>>GR is a predictive theory and everything in th...DL<BR/><BR/>>>GR is a predictive theory and everything in the universe follows its rules (as far as we know, and per the theory).<<<BR/><BR/>You did not engage my point. GR refers to a formulation or description that captures an aspect of reality. As a formulation, it was caused by the reality it describes. At the same time, the reality that caused the formulation is such that it can only be captured by that formulation. The same can be said about the metanorm of rationality.<BR/><BR/>To continue with your latest objection, how can you know that the GR is successfully predictive unless there actually are correct as opposed to incorrect ways of arriving at conclusions? The formulation of GR is only worth something insofar as it is a conclusion correctly arrived at, and for it to be that kind of conclusion there must be correct ways of reaching it. Apart from the metanorm nothing meaningful can even be thought about GR, much less claimed for it.<BR/><BR/>>>And certainly not everything operates in accordance with the metanorm.<<<BR/><BR/>It does to the following extent: Everything in nature apart from what is immediately present to the senses can only be apprehended in the form of conclusions correctly arrived at. In that sense much of nature (and what lies beyond nature) must accord with the metanorm.<BR/><BR/>>>An example. In order for us to call something a cat, it ought to meet certain conditions.<<<BR/><BR/>Turn this around. We have the category "cat" because of the way certain animals actually are. That is, our idea of what distinguishes a cat, to the extent that it is realistic, is determined by the assemblage of flesh-and-blood features that actually sets cats apart from other mammals. We did not invent the label "cat" on a lark and then go shopping through the zoo to find some creature we could pin it on like a prize ribbon.<BR/><BR/>>>nor did it cause cats to evolve.<<<BR/><BR/>Cats presumably evolved because of selection pressure. But according to your argument, "selection pressure" is just a set of parameters we define. There is a kind of "metanorm of selection pressure" that causes us to label certain physical processes as "selective." That's it!?!?<BR/><BR/>Again, this just type of objection relies on the ambiguity between an existent and the description or expression by which we identify that existent.<BR/><BR/>>>Likewise, the metanorm of rationality causes us to label a mind as rational. That's it.<<<BR/><BR/>The metanorm is a description or expression of a reality. Realities can only be referred to by descriptions. (How basic is this?)<BR/><BR/>>>The thing that causes the rationality is a physical process, an instinct.<<<BR/><BR/>If so, it is an instinct or a process that distinguishes between correct and incorrect ways of arriving at conclusions. And for there to be such a process there must be an actual, real, genuine dinstinction between correct and incorrect ways, right? That's all the metanorm says--that there is such a distinction.<BR/><BR/>But if this process or instinct were physical, it would be confirmable. That's part of what it means to call it physical! But correctness/incorrectness of ways of arriving at conclusions is not confirmable, remember? So this process or instinct cannot be physical after all.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-64300825482906208792008-04-07T16:28:00.000-07:002008-04-07T16:28:00.000-07:00Darek,There's a huge difference between GR and the...Darek,<BR/><BR/>There's a huge difference between GR and the metanorm.<BR/><BR/>GR is a predictive theory and everything in the universe follows its rules (as far as we know, and per the theory). In contrast, the metanorm is a moral preference which predicts nothing. And certainly not everything operates in accordance with the metanorm. <BR/><BR/>The metanorm of rationality is what something ought to do before we label it as 'rational'. It is not the cause of that rationality. <BR/><BR/>An example. In order for us to call something a cat, it ought to meet certain conditions (having four legs, tail, fur, fangs, inability to digest sugar, or some substantial portion of the above). But this "metanorm of felinity" (the norm for us to describe something as a cat) does not cause embryos to grow up to be cats, nor did it cause cats to evolve. It's not causal. The only thing it causes is us to label something as a cat.<BR/><BR/>Likewise, the metanorm of rationality causes us to label a mind as rational. That's it.<BR/><BR/>The thing that causes the rationality is a physical process, an instinct.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-56156022136453922212008-04-07T06:55:00.000-07:002008-04-07T06:55:00.000-07:00DL>>It is our instinct for individual methods of i...DL<BR/><BR/>>>It is our instinct for individual methods of inference that leads us to create the abstraction we refer to as the metanorm.<<<BR/><BR/>I suppose that it is individual cases of gravitational interaction that caused Einstein to create the General Theory of Relativity. So we would have the arrow backwards equally if we answered questions of causation regarding gravitational interaction by invoking the General Theory. This cuts across all of science, then.<BR/><BR/>The General Theory, to the extent that it is true, captures the causal reality of gravitational interactions. I suppose that particular formulations of it in symbolic terms humans can understand is a causal result rather than a driver, but whatever it is that can be represented to the human mind in no other way but by such formulations is a driver of gravitational effects, not a result of them. Otherwise no cause can ever be contemplated as such by the human mind.<BR/><BR/>Some kind of expression of the metanorm may be, necessarily, the means by which the mind grasps discrimination principle at work in rationality. But that which is grasped by means of the expressions cannot be denied a causal role simply because it is by means of expressions that it is grasped.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-84958760915733442062008-04-06T18:44:00.000-07:002008-04-06T18:44:00.000-07:00Hi Darek,I think you have the arrow of causation b...Hi Darek,<BR/><BR/>I think you have the arrow of causation backwards in your argument. The metanorm is a rational abstraction of our best reasoning instincts. It is not that the metanorm causes us to think that there are correct methods of inference. It is our instinct for individual methods of inference that leads us to create the abstraction we refer to as the metanorm. Or, to put it another way, the metanorm is the name we give to the instincts (in the abstract).<BR/><BR/>Since the instinct is the cause of our correct thinking, it is easily reduced to a mechanism because instincts <I>are</I> mechanisms.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-31288594120630002442008-04-06T14:36:00.001-07:002008-04-06T14:36:00.001-07:00DB: I don't have to infer that your claim "The TV ...DB: I don't have to infer that your claim "The TV is on the table" is true, especially when we are in the same room. You keep trying to insert inferences into my mind that I am saying we aren't making. This is why I brought up observation judgments. We can continue this on Victor's post on my comment if you want, as I push this line of thought there.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-13228396383516188832008-04-06T14:36:00.000-07:002008-04-06T14:36:00.000-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-9476740745188406042008-04-05T15:59:00.000-07:002008-04-05T15:59:00.000-07:00DL>>One way is to say that this behavior constitut...DL<BR/><BR/>>>One way is to say that this behavior constitutes un/subconscious awareness of the metanorm.<<<BR/><BR/>How can "behavior" constitute "awareness"? Behavior can be an evidence of awareness. Perhaps you mean the metanorm can exert influence on a subject who is oblivious to the fact that there are correct versus incorrect ways of arriving at conclusions. The metanorm is a driver of behavior in such a case. In naturalism, all drivers of behavior are confirmable. The metanorm is inherently unconfirmable.<BR/><BR/>>>The other way of looking at the definition is to say that only a conscious, reflective appreciation for the metanorm as an abstraction counts as having a causal metanorm.<<<BR/><BR/>Rational people can assert that some conclusions "just make sense" given certain grounds or antecedents while other conclusions "just don't." They may not use the precise words of my formulation of the metanorm, but they use words that substantially convey the idea. We judge the degree of a person's rationality, in fact, by the extent to which they appreciate the distinction between good and bad reasoning. But we don't require people to use the glossary of formal logic or specialized terms before we attribute rationality to them.<BR/><BR/>With that in mind, the ability to distinguish in some measure between sound and fallacious reasoning plays a causal role frequently in the lives of human beings. I am surprised that I actually have to argue for this point.<BR/><BR/>BTW, in case it is not clear, I use "metanorm" to distinguish my proposition about correctness/incorrectness of ways of arriving at conclusions from putative "norms" of reason such as the laws of thought and the rules of inference. The metanorm is primary to these, offering a ground from which we can explore and evaluate what are commonly considered to be rational norms.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-71909689490960071642008-04-05T06:49:00.000-07:002008-04-05T06:49:00.000-07:00Hi Doctor Logic,You use an interesting example, bu...Hi Doctor Logic,<BR/><BR/>You use an interesting example, but I would press you on it.<BR/><BR/>You say:<BR/>"It seems to me that you would say that solar systems don't have sidereal days or years unless someone is there to see them"<BR/><BR/>In the absense of any intelligent life forms, I would argue that whatever exists would not be cut up into 'days' and 'years' or by 'solar system' or 'star'. These are human concepts. There is something out there, but it is not cut into the joints we use. (I.e., the 'big dipper' is not really in the sky, humans have cut the sky up that way, though the matter is still all there)<BR/><BR/>So, I would say that the time teller example is still valid. In a world devoid of intelligence, there would be no concepts. Thus, the concept of 'time teller' would not be there, though the exact mechanism would be. In the same way, the concept of 'day' and 'planet' would not be there, although all the matter would be the same.<BR/><BR/>Cheers.Rinohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13450913302331411646noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-16491677873378302972008-04-05T05:25:00.000-07:002008-04-05T05:25:00.000-07:00Hi Darek,I should have been clearer. Suppose I ha...Hi Darek,<BR/><BR/>I should have been clearer. Suppose I have an intuition for deduction and inductive inference. And my past experiences of success and failure lead me to apply them in particular contexts. <BR/><BR/>There are two possible ways of looking at this. One way is to say that this behavior constitutes un/subconscious awareness of the metanorm. The way that a bird has unconscious awareness of the metanorm of flying. In that case, we have a straightforward way of reducing human minds and illustrating metanorm awareness. The metanorm instinct is certainly causal in such a model because metanorm has been identified with a causal instinct, and an instinct is a mechanism.<BR/><BR/>(BTW, contemporary software does not typically implement any such instinct. There are some research instances, I'm sure, but most PC's don't have the instinct because they lack awareness. Yet I think that creating such an awareness would be quite trivial.)<BR/><BR/>The other way of looking at the definition is to say that only a conscious, reflective appreciation for the metanorm as an abstraction counts as having a causal metanorm. In that case, the metanorm is rarely a causal factor in our thinking.<BR/><BR/>Which do you prefer?Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-36121359531989412822008-04-04T21:57:00.000-07:002008-04-04T21:57:00.000-07:00DLVery well, let's call the metanorm of rationalit...DL<BR/><BR/>Very well, let's call the metanorm of rationality an intuition. Are you really going to press the claim that your intuition that there are correct versus incorrect ways of arriving at conclusions plays no causal role in your thought processes? Really?<BR/><BR/>Remember how I said that whenever we construct an intellectual product we find the metanorm of rationality underneath holding it all up. Your last post is such a product. Do you recommend it as consisting of conclusions correctly arrived at? If so, you make my case for me.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-53024715210598231532008-04-04T21:14:00.000-07:002008-04-04T21:14:00.000-07:00Darek,So how do we give the metanorm the causal ro...Darek,<BR/><BR/><I>So how do we give the metanorm the causal role to play in a mechanism that it plays in our own mental life?</I><BR/><BR/>What role does the metanorm play? Well, most of the time, it plays no role at all. We simply can't help ourselves acting rationally.<BR/><BR/>We do what we do by instinct, or by social convention. People did this for a long time before the Greeks showed up and began to tell us about the metanorms of rationality. Indeed, a lot of inner city folk are quite oblivious to the metanorms, and yet they apply reason.<BR/><BR/>The metanorm is an abstraction from our intuitions about thinking.<BR/><BR/>So I would say that the reduction of a mind would have to show that there were intuitions and instincts for rational processes, and rather imperfect ones at that. The mind mechanism would also have to be able to make abstractions about mental processes and experiences in order to be able to comprehend the metanorm as we do.<BR/><BR/>I have to reject the comparison with M theory. M theory is a theory of causation, and even if the theory is inexplicable if it is fundamental, it causes everything else we see. The metanorm is not a force that compels rational things to happen in our minds, at least not directly. It is an abstraction of our best instincts for reaching conclusions.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-32611929814288702012008-04-04T20:47:00.000-07:002008-04-04T20:47:00.000-07:00Hi Rino,Perhaps it would be best to make the point...Hi Rino,<BR/><BR/><I>Perhaps it would be best to make the point in the second way that I mentioned: no human exists and the wind whips up the exact same mechanism that we today call a watch. Is it a time-teller in that case? I would argue no.</I><BR/><BR/>How about days and years? If I live on a planet in a solar system, I can use the planetary rotation and the annual orbit to define the notion of years and days.<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that you would say that solar systems don't have sidereal days or years unless someone is there to see them.<BR/><BR/>So I strongly disagree with you on this point. A watch is a time-keeper because time-keeper refers to what we would call it if we were there. Alternatively, it refers to what it could possibly be used for, if we were there to make use of it.<BR/><BR/>You are making a distinction about the intent of an object, not what it is. You are saying that the watch whipped-up by the wind was not the product of design or intention, or was not actually and intentionally used for time-telling. That distinction is all well and good, but it doesn't prove that intent and design cannot be reduced. Indeed, I think that intent and design are reducible.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-90694530255053001412008-04-04T19:52:00.000-07:002008-04-04T19:52:00.000-07:00BDKI'm fairly prosaic myself, to tell the truth.>>...BDK<BR/><BR/><BR/>I'm fairly prosaic myself, to tell the truth.<BR/><BR/>>>I see we have an ability to detect true/false sentences, an ability to see or formulate patterns amongst the truth values of sentences.<<<BR/><BR/>Would I be way out of line here to take your word "see" to mean "understand" or "conclude"? Would it be wild to think that you could just as well have said, "I conclude based on observation that we have the ability . . ." Now, is this ability that you conclude we have "to detect true/false sentences" effectively the ability to arrive at sound conclusions (at least sometimes) about whether sentences are true or false? If it is, then we can recast your statement as follows:<BR/><BR/>"I conclude (soundly, I think) that we have the ability to reach sound conclusions."<BR/><BR/>You must see the problem. The first part of the sentence already assumes our ability (at least occasionally) to reach sound conclusions. If you assume it in order to conclude it, you haven't really concluded it. This illustrates what DL has called the incorrigibility of the proposition that there are correct and incorrect ways of arriving at conclusions--what I call the metanorm of rationality.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-24483388130214040672008-04-04T19:30:00.000-07:002008-04-04T19:30:00.000-07:00DL>>So that means that the metanorm is probably ob...DL<BR/><BR/>>>So that means that the metanorm is probably objective in a trivial way.<<<BR/><BR/>Yes, to the extent that triviality here is, as you go on to say, the same as incorrigibility. Not only do we find that we cannot help believe that the metanorm is true, but that it is true for all minds at all times. Whatever we start to build, in terms of the products of intellect, we find the metanorm there at the bottom holding everything up while it itself seems to be bottomless (resonates with your term "unfathomable"). Calling it "trivial" can be a backhanded way of acknowledging it as fundamental.<BR/><BR/>As Victor has pointed out, if there is a fundamental constituent of matter/energy--say the vibrating strings of M Theory--these constituents are the way they are because they are that way, not because of further sub-constituents. They are physically "trivial," as it were. At the bottom level of material reality are these strings, but the strings are, so to speak, bottomless. But that's exactly what we find with the metanorm of rationality except that it is mentalistic rather than material.<BR/><BR/>>>At the same time, this does not constitute a formal, rational proof that the intuition is correct (due to circularity).<<<BR/><BR/>Exactly. It's scarry to find so much agreement between us.<BR/><BR/>>>Now, if I were arguing that a working model of a material mind would physically prove how we ought to think, then I would side with you.<<<BR/><BR/>This has come up before. I have tried to say that the question is not so much that reduction must "prove" the metanorm. It is that in order to interpret the metanorm in terms of some physical parameter of the mechanism in its environment, we must turn the metanorm into something confirmable--which it simply cannot be.<BR/><BR/>So how do we give the metanorm the causal role to play in a mechanism that it plays in our own mental life? We just cannot do so, except that in the case of a computer the metanorm influences how we design the mechanism and interpret its outputs. Our minds seem to be the medium through which the metanorm influences the computer's function. If mechanism as such cannot have everything that our rational mental life does, then our rational mental life is something more than mechanism.<BR/><BR/>C. S. Lewis put it as follows. He said that whenever we mentally try to put rational thought into a purely naturalistic, mechanical picture of reality, we find that the thought we have put into the picture is different from the kind of thought we were engaged in as we put it in. Here we see one reason why--because the naturalistic model cannot, in virtue of its purely natural character, make causal room for the metanorm of rationality.<BR/><BR/>The AfR draws out an implication: Naturalism cannot be a complete description of reality; reality has an irreducibly mentalistic aspect. Note that this is not an attempt to justify the norm, but to allow room for the norm to play the causal role in our thought processes that it self-evidently does.<BR/><BR/>So, what philosophical points of view are compatible with an irreducibly mental aspect of reality? Theism--the belief that an all-governing mind is the bedrock of everything that exists--is not the only contender, but it is a strong one.<BR/><BR/>>>In the case of the metanorm, it is objectively true in any instance of reasoning because it is an axiom of reasoning. That doesn't make the metanorm objectively true outside of this context.<<<BR/><BR/>Well, I would just direct you to your earlier comment that you couldn't think of a definition of "objectivity" that does not presuppose the metanorm. The metanorm of rationality is the axiom that lies below all reasoning about the role of axioms. It is the context outside of which nothing can be conceived of as "objectively true," including scientific inferences.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-78365792479998312392008-04-04T13:25:00.000-07:002008-04-04T13:25:00.000-07:00(this is Rino)Hi Doctor LogicPerhaps it would be b...(this is Rino)<BR/><BR/>Hi Doctor Logic<BR/><BR/>Perhaps it would be best to make the point in the second way that I mentioned: no human exists and the wind whips up the exact same mechanism that we today call a watch. Is it a time-teller in that case? I would argue no. No one intended it to tell time, no one is reading time off of it, it is not a time-teller. However, it has the same mechanism. Therefore, since identities are like mary's little lamb ("everywhere that Mary went the lamb was sure to go"), then these things cannot be identified, for one exists without the other. Thus, we cannot identify 'time-telling' as a macroproperty of the mechanism with the underlying realizers. This conclusion brings about a non-reductive picture, but it should not be threatening to you as a naturalist. There are plenty of non-reductive physicalists. And that is one step in the right direction :)<BR/><BR/>Incidentally, I agree with you on the rabbit example, and your endorsement of content internalism. <BR/>I agree that we can be abstracting 'time-teller' about the watch, and that abstraction is a product of our own minds.<BR/><BR/>However, I think we have to add one thing. For the sake of honesty, we have to assume that our abstraction really corresponds to the way the world actually is. For example, when we say 'that is a time teller', we cannot then say 'but that object has no 'time-telling properties', I'm just talking as if it is a time teller, but it is not. Dennett, with his intentional stance, is bad at doing this. If we go down that route, we end up endorsing massive amounts of fictitious story telling about the world, that no good scientist should embrace, I would argue.<BR/><BR/>So, we have to also assume that the watch has the intelligible property of 'time-telling'. I think you have agreed on this point, so I won't belabour the point. One thing I will add: it is fair to ask where intelligible properties come from. Ie, when we say 'the clock is really telling time', how did the clock become a time-teller? Obviously, someone had to make it with that purpose. Otherwise, there would be no reason to suppose it was really a time teller.<BR/><BR/>Anyway...carry on.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-86826115049409723622008-04-04T11:50:00.000-07:002008-04-04T11:50:00.000-07:00I've seen the identical mental allergy to normativ...I've seen the identical mental allergy to normative irrealism in the case of epistemic norms as we see in the case of moral norms.<BR/><BR/>Just as the theist insists he *must* be dragged, kicking and screaming by the ineluctable power of some mysterious force called a "transcendent moral objective truth", into helping little old ladies across the street, so he insists that without some "objective rational metanorm" he can see no reason to go about believing true things.Staircaseghosthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02647353730607650698noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-87350513856276155072008-04-04T09:22:00.000-07:002008-04-04T09:22:00.000-07:00DB: Huh?I'm much more prosaic than all this 'metan...DB: Huh?<BR/><BR/>I'm much more prosaic than all this 'metanorm of rationality' business. <BR/><BR/>I'm just observing some things. E.g., I see we have an ability to detect true/false sentences, an ability to see or formulate patterns amongst the truth values of sentences. So, for people interested in truth, these are useful properties to know about.<BR/><BR/>I leave it to anyone interested in the language of metanorms to determine whether I'm discussing them. I don't care what we call it.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-38688889750864739352008-04-03T19:59:00.000-07:002008-04-03T19:59:00.000-07:00Darek,Every stitch of your current argument presup...Darek,<BR/><BR/><I>Every stitch of your current argument presupposes the metanorm of rationality as objective fact, not mere human convention. Otherwise neither of us has an objective basis for appealing to the other or to anyone else who happens to be reading this.</I><BR/><BR/>But we're both human. :) <BR/><BR/>But seriously, I'm not sure in what sense you are using the term objective here. What is the test of objectivity? There are several meanings of the word, and I would say that each of those meanings presupposes the metanorm. So that means that the metanorm is probably objective in a trivial way.<BR/><BR/>However, I think you are missing my point with this objectivity issue.<BR/><BR/>For whatever reason (or perhaps for unfathomable reasons), we have a sense of what constitutes correct reasoning. We find this intuition to be incorrigible because we can never reach an alternative conclusion. At the same time, this does not constitute a formal, rational proof that the intuition is correct (due to circularity). Thus, the metanorm is an intuition that we all share, and that we all presuppose whenever we use language propositions.<BR/><BR/>When it comes to the reduction of human minds to physical mechanisms, the question is not whether our intuitions about reason are formally correct. The question is whether material minds reason in accordance with our intuitions (unprovable as they may be).<BR/><BR/>Now, if I were arguing that a working model of a material mind would physically prove how we ought to think, then I would side with you. I would supposedly be proving an ought from an is, which is not possible. However, it is not the intent of the reductionist to prove how one ought to think. The goal is to prove that a material mind thinks the way we think it ought to, i.e., according to the metanorm.<BR/><BR/>Finally, I want to say one more thing about the objectivity of the metanorm. The metanorm is presupposed in every argument. So it acts much like an axiom (or perhaps a meta-axiom). Now, axioms are assumed true. And for the purposes of a logical argument, axioms are objectively true. This is why I think the objective status of the metanorm is confusing. The axioms of Euclidean geometry are objectively true within the scope of Euclidean geometry, but they are not objectively true in the broader sense. It's like an algebra problem where we are given x=5. In the scope of the problem, it is objectively true that x=5. But it is not objectively true that x=5 in all problems or all contexts. <BR/><BR/>In the case of the metanorm, it is objectively true in any instance of reasoning because it is an axiom of reasoning. That doesn't make the metanorm objectively true outside of this context. It's not like the objectivity of the fact that the fine structure constant is 1/127. The latter is objectively true while not being an axiom. I guess I would say that all scientific truths are meta-theorems. So the scientific truth that we reduce to physical mechanisms can only be a theorem of our founding assumptions, one of which is the metanorm of rationality.Doctor Logichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03182745193512661770noreply@blogger.com