tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post5082743350936490568..comments2024-01-21T14:29:38.613-08:00Comments on Dangerous Idea 2: Hasker on the divide and conquer strategyVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-15828598279254340652007-03-22T21:59:00.000-07:002007-03-22T21:59:00.000-07:00If I'm reading him right, Hasker is basically argu...If I'm reading him right, Hasker is basically arguing that functionalism is dishonest.<BR/><BR/>I.e., you have to have either<B>eliminative</B> materialism or the non-naturalizability of intentionality.stunneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12124063637351650889noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-87278443377631327412007-03-22T17:59:00.000-07:002007-03-22T17:59:00.000-07:00Derek: there is a wall of terminology in every phi...Derek: there is a wall of terminology in every philosophical debate (e.g., think of all the goofy terminology in theology). <BR/><BR/>Usually the terms turn out to be shorthand for ideas that are pretty simple. Any good intro philmind book should define all the terms clearly. Not that I know of one off hand. Indeed, most intro to philmind books I have seen sort of suck: very idiosyncratic and tendentious (e.g., a goofy Wittgensteinian perspective).<BR/><BR/>But the thing to be wary of, which you are rightly wary of, is hyper-specialization within a field that is making incorrect assumptions to begin with. In such subfields people are basically wasting time. This is how I look at theology. But it might hold for "functionalist" theories of mind, too. Philosophers, with a few assumptions, end up making elaborate and creative edifices with lots of subtle distinctions that in the future will look foolish or like a waste of energy (e.g., a 500 page PhD on the truth conditions of the word 'hole'). <BR/><BR/>I think it is important to be wary of philosophers who say "You just don't understand" when you question their basic assumptions. Dennett likes to do this. If they are good philosophers, they will be able to explain it to you (perhaps there are exceptions in philosophy of very technical fields: philosophical implications of renormalization techniques in quantum field theory).<BR/><BR/>Philosophy is weird. It aims to question assumptions, but philosophers, unconstrained by data, are subject to some of the most silly fads which end up sucking the life from the discipline. Naturalism right now is probably a bit of a fad (though it happens to be right :)). I think this is unhealthy, even though I think naturalism is true.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-54572791390519092332007-03-22T06:55:00.000-07:002007-03-22T06:55:00.000-07:00It is interesting to read Hasker's comment and the...It is interesting to read Hasker's comment and then go over and read the Stanford online article on Functionalism--specifically, the subhead under Introspective States. (The following subhead, Functionalism and the Norms of Reason, is also of interest for obvious reasons.)<BR/><BR/>By no means do I despair that a layman (like myself) can grasp the essentials of the AfR or the problem of intentionality. But the academic references on the subject are so prolific and even the summaries of them are so esoteric that they do put a lot of smoke in the air, so to speak. Can someone hope to adjudicate them on an informed basis without actually being a philosopher? And are the issues as rarified, nuanced and inscrutably tangled as the academic summaries make them appear? These are questions that are bound to confront even a reasonably well-read explorer of the issues.Darek Barefoothttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10372516755957865348noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-92064375588745487792007-03-21T19:53:00.000-07:002007-03-21T19:53:00.000-07:00On his second point: a main goal for naturalistic ...On his second point: a main goal for naturalistic approaches to intentionality (propositional contents) is to give an account of reference, which is the type of aboutness that propositional states are taken to have (e.g., the twinearthers have internal states that are about twater). This gets you truth, which gets you the ability to have error. All important semantic properties, regardless of their association (or lack thereof) with qualia.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps he addresses such accounts later. I'd be curious where he does in his book so I can review it.<BR/><BR/>Also, when he says:<BR/><I> Furthermore, the claim that a person is in such an intentional state is clearly not equivalent, logically or conceptually, to any causal-functional description of the person. </I><BR/><BR/>As long as it turns out to be extensionally equivalant, that is the most important thing (similar to water and H20). Water is not logically or conceptually equivalent to H20, but it is identical to H20. Just like lightning is electrostatic discharge. Meanings aren't a good guide to ontology, which is why philosophy is of limited use when we don't yet have the extension nailed down.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.com