tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post5504831380843481817..comments2024-01-21T14:29:38.613-08:00Comments on Dangerous Idea 2: Hasker on Ham-fisted empiricismVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-69835371198368635082007-07-12T08:59:00.000-07:002007-07-12T08:59:00.000-07:00Also, her paper Is logic a theory of the obvious? ...Also, her paper <A HREF="http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/gsher/ILTO.pdf" REL="nofollow">Is logic a theory of the obvious?</A> is a lot of fun.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38436816.post-84284565794197557692007-07-12T08:51:00.000-07:002007-07-12T08:51:00.000-07:00But this sort of “logical empiricism” is at best a...<I>But this sort of “logical empiricism” is at best a very crude method for assessing the goodness of arguments. There are plenty of invalid arguments with true conclusions, and plenty of valid arguments with false conclusions. There are even good inductive arguments with all true premises in which the conclusions are false. There are just the distinctions which the science of logic exists to help us with; basing the science on the kind of ham-fisted empiricism described above is a hopeless enterprise.</I><BR/><BR/>This could probably be studied empirically: is it enough to base logic on observed patterns of truth/falsity for different types of inference rules? I tend to think it is enough, especially given that logic didn't spring forth immediately from Aristotle's head, and didn't end with his developments. It has been a long and slow tortured development.<BR/><BR/>I like Gila Sher's take in her paper <A HREF="http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/gsher/LCEO.pdf" REL="nofollow">Logical Consequence: an epistemic outlook</A>, in which logical truths are sensitive to empirical facts, though only rarely so.Blue Devil Knighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12045468316613818510noreply@blogger.com