My new way of putting the argument from reason together

I reformulated the argument from reason as follows:

A version of the argument from reason.

1. If naturalism is true, then propositional attitudes are eliminable, reducible, or epiphenomenal.
2. Propositional attitudes are not eliminable.
3. Propositional attitudes are not reducible.
4. Propositional attitudes are not epiphenomenal.
5. Therefore, naturalism is false.

Philosophopickle wrote: Very interesting. I wonder, though, if one is able to reply that propositions supervene naturally on a certain state or set of relations (specifically in the brain). Hopefully we see more on this.

VR: Yes, but would those states be causally effective, or would they, as I suspect, be epiphenomenal. This argument plan attempts to combine the argument from propositional attitudes with the argument from mental causation. It seems to me that if you are arguing with a reductionist, the argument from intentional/propositional states is effective, since I think there are good anti-reductionist arguments. However, if you are dealing with a non-reductivist, the mental causation argument is the way to make your case. So I'm combining them.