Reply to Weekend Fisher
Hi there
I'm an occasional reader finding my way here through CADRE Comments, with an interest in the "Dangerous Idea" to a greater degree and the Lewis/Anscombe debate to a lesser degree, only as it relates to the larger question.
I have to say that, on review of the argument, I disagree with Lewis about whether a naturalistic universe necessarily leads to a distrust of mind.
I'm not what you would call a naturalist, more what you would call a Christian with a high view of material creation.
I was wondering if I could ask you one thing: if you had to state succintly the strongest version of that argument that you knew, if you were trying to show me logically that logic itself or reason itself falls apart in a naturalistic world, what would you say? What would be your opening move?
Are you interested in exchanging posts to explore a little more? I'm interested in hammering out the argument to see where it goes.
Take care & God bless
WF
There is a first step in the argument, which is getting a definition of a naturalistic world-view, the proper target for the argument. I have a definition for a naturalistic world-view: A naturalistic world-view has there characteristic:
1) At the level of the most fundamental particles, the universe is free of purpose, free of normativity, free of intentionality (aboutness) and fully describable from a third-person perspective. In short, there is a "physical" level which is complete mechanistic, not in the sense of being deterministic, but in the sense of being purposeless.
2) That level is causally closed. There is nothing at any other level of analysis the provides an independent cause of events over and above the physical level.
3) Whatever else exists supervenes on the physical. Given the state of they physical, every other level (chemical, biological, psychological, sociological), must be the way that it is.
Now the first thing I want to ask is that if the "naturalism" you have in mind to defend meets this description, or not?
I'm not sure I want to talk about distrusting reason. I vastly prefer Best Explanation versions of the Argument from Reason as opposed to Skeptical Threat arguments. There is reason, the question is whether the kind of universe I just described can explain it. (No skyhooks allowed, just cranes).
Labels: Defining naturalism
posted by Victor Reppert @ 11:36 PM
9 Comments
9 Comments:
Hi there
So as to your question whether the naturalism I'm discussing meets your definitions, I'd say that I personally don't believe the in the existence of the hypothetical world you described in those points, and certainly don't believe we live in such a world. Given that, I'm not sure whether you're interested in pursuing what my actual objections are.
Here's my actual objection. Given the physical world as it exists and as we can observe it, I don't see why the hypothesis that it arose based on physical causes alone would lead to the conclusion that there's no reason to believe reason's validity. Further, I don't see why the hypothesis that our minds and thoughts can be understood in terms of biochemical processes should be doubted, or should cause any distress to a Christian if proved true.
Would you be interested in pursuing that, or is that beyond your areas of interest?
Take care & God bless
No, but the point I wanted to stress is that you do want to show that reason doesn't cause a problem for a naturalistic world view. You are saying, I take it, that if the world were as I described, there is no problem explaining the fact that reason existed.
The important thing I wanted to stress is that in order for the discussion to proceed we have to be clear on what physical causes are. They are mechanistic in the sense that there is no purpose at the most basic level of analysis. We cannot admit any kind of aboutness to a purely physical description, we cannot admit normativity, we cannot admit subjectivity of any kind. We have to be clear on what physical causes are. Do we agree on our definition of what we mean when we say that everything arose as the result of physical causes?
VR: They are mechanistic in the sense that there is no purpose at the most basic level of analysis.
WF: Let's look at that more closely; sleeping dragons and all that. Once an organism has developed beyond a single cell -- heck, once an organism is even so much as a single cell -- then there are material structures (organs or organelles, depending on your level of analysis) that have a "purpose" or a function; like our heart muscles are very mechanistic but still have a "purpose" or function. Organic things work that way.
I suspect that brain function / thought / reason can be adequately explained as an advanced organic function. Where the heart supplies blood and nutrients to the organism, the brain supplies a model of the world to the organism, an evaluative framework.
Keep in mind I'm Christian, I'm not trying to annoy anyone's faith; I just suspect God is such an artist that He got these results even using such base materials.
Would you see a problem in positing our thoughts and ideas as part of a system that did have a "purpose" (at least at the same level that the heart has a purpose)? What objections would you raise against the brain having a purpose that are distinct from the heart having a purpose?
Take care & God bless
WF, if I may. When you ask:
"if you were trying to show me logically that logic itself or reason itself falls apart in a naturalistic world, what would you say? What would be your opening move?", (my emphasis)
Dr. Reppert must first properly define the target (naturalism) before anything more can be discussed. He's not trying to convince you that the universe is purposeless, he's trying to define the term.
Since there seems to be a disconnect here, maybe _you_ can define the term "naturalism" instead. How can one answer your question if one doesn't know your definition, and you don't accept the one Dr. Reppert offered?
Are you proposing a functionalist theory of mental states? Because it looks to me as if some things can serve the function of mental states without actually being in those mental states. For example, my home computer running Fritz will massacre me every time in speed chess. There is something it is like to find a winning combination against Reppert, and while there are many chess players who have experienced what it is like to find a winning combination against Reppert in chess, there is nothing it is like for a computer to find a winning combination against Reppert. The function is there, the inner state is not.
"Dr. Reppert must first properly define the target (naturalism) before anything more can be discussed."
Appears to me that he is also attacking some forms of Christianity here. Or maybe I should say those Christians who take the view that God created a world that produced sentient creatures though the mechanism of evolution.
If one believes that God created the world to be completely self sufficient so that all phenomena in it are the result of natural processes then it is difficult to take the Dangerous Idea presented here as anything but a misunderstanding of God's creative activity.
Anon: If one believes that God created the world to be completely self sufficient so that all phenomena in it are the result of natural processes then it is difficult to take the Dangerous Idea presented here as anything but a misunderstanding of God's creative activity.
VR: And the resurrection of Christ from the dead would be a natural result of God's initial creative act? What Christian believes that?
"And the resurrection of Christ from the dead would be a natural result of God's initial creative act? What Christian believes that?"
Mr. Reppert,
I don't quite follow you. How does the self-sufficient, independence of the physical world logically preclude the possiblity of God performing a miracle?
Believing in the resurrection of Jesus does not require one to deny that the human mind is a result of natural evolutionary processes.
Quite true. What I take it you meant was the idea that the natural world, which includes the world of human action, is a closed physical system, apart from any miraculous activity God might be involved in.
There is an important and key difference between what I might call Christian quasi-naturalism (Van Till style functional integrity, etc.) and naturalism per se, and it is that for naturalism per se the physical is not only closed after creation but also the initial conditions are design-free, while for CQN (the position, I take it, that people like Weekend Fisher are trying to defend, as well as Christian materialists in the philosophy of mind like Nancey Murphy) at least the initial conditions are designed. Now there are a couple of different ways of looking at these initial conditions. We might think, on the one hand, that these not only were designed, but that they show evidence of design (and therefore accept some version of the fine-tuning argument) or we might say that while we believe them to have been designed, we might think that God did it in such a way as not to leave fingerprints that science can discover, and so we might accept the idea that even though we think those initial condition are there by design, it is just as reasonable to suppose that they are what they are as a result of, say, our happening to be in a universe that supports life because all of them really exist, and we happen to be in a life-permitting one and not a life-hostile one (big surprise there). People committed to CQN must believe that the universe as it began is the result of design, the question is whether this can be made evident to science or not.
Now it looks like there are some versions of the argument from reason that, if they work, require something more than just a designed beginning. For example, if our knowing necessary truths requires causal interaction with eternal realities, this is going to undermine the causal closure of the physical, since the physical realm is a temporal and not an eternal realm. So if that argument works, it's an argument against CQN as well as naturalism. But do all the arguments require this? Are any of the arguments from reason arguments against naturalism but not against Christian quasi-naturalism?
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