Reply to exapologist on neutral monism
I'm not sure why we're supposed to accept (1). It seems to entail that neutral monist accounts of matter (e.g. Type-F monism) aren't forms of naturalism. Of course, you could define 'naturalism' in such a way as to preclude neutral monism, but I'm not sure how interesting that would be.
Dan Stoljar has a couple of papers defending Type-F monism -- they're worth checking out!
In any case, since I think neutral monist theories are naturalistic theories are naturalistic theories (at least some versions of it -- Spinoza's version is borderline), I think premise (1) is false, rendering the argument unsound.
The problem here is that in the way I have drawn the distinction between mentalistic and materialistic world-views. A world-view counts as mentalistic if "mental" type explanations can be basic explanations. A materialistic world-view is one in which mental-type explanations cannot be basic explanations. I can't figure out how to be neutral about that.